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ABSTRACT 
    Although past research has emphasized the importance of international environmental 
agreements in redressing environmental degradation, systematic assessments of regime 
effects are missing. The central focus of this paper is assessing the effectiveness of 
international environmental agreements: do international environmental agreements 
actually improve environmental quality? Most of the research in the field of 
environmental protection has focused on the role of economic development and the 
political system. Several studies have found that the relationship between a countries 
wealth and some pollutants follow an inverted U-shaped curve, popularly known in the 
literature as the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC). Again scholars have also found 
that democratic countries have better environmental records compared to authoritarian 
polities. 
    Using generalized least squares on a panel data set consisting of sixty six countries 
who were members of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, for a time 
period of ten years (1991-2000), I found that international environmental agreements 
exert significant influence in ensuring environmental quality. Most importantly, 
industrialized countries, who are again members of UNFCCC under the Annex 1 
category, tend to emit less. Similarly, economic development and a democratic polity 
also help in ameliorating environmental condition. Therefore, one can conclude that 
institutions do matter, even if they are non-binding, in bringing about desired changes.  
 
 
 1 
INTRODUCTION 
    Despite the paucity of judicial means of dispute resolutions and the ongoing pursuit of 
developing countries to alleviate their economic conditions, international agreements 
have been established in increasing numbers in the area of environmental protection. The 
rapid proliferation of international environmental agreements has led most analysts to 
focus on their formulation, negotiation and content. Yet little empirical analysis of the 
effectiveness of these environmental accords has been done so far. 
   The central focus of this paper is the effectiveness of these agreements: simply, do 
international environmental agreements actually improve environmental quality? 
Effectiveness is defined as the degree to which international environmental accords lead 
to changes in behavior that helps to solve environmental problem (Victor, Raustiala & 
Skolnikoff 1998). However, effectiveness does not imply getting rid of the problem 
altogether.  
    This question is interesting because all international regimes face problems with free 
riders, holdouts and defectors, this is even more so for environmental regimes. 
Regulation seems to entail large and visible short-term costs to entrenched business 
interests. It is also viewed as discriminating between rich and poor countries. The 
benefits are often widely dispersed in time and space, and it is often fairly easy for an 
actor to extract them without accepting the burdens of compliance.  
   Agreements for environmental protection in the contemporary context constitute a type 
of “soft and functional regimes” (Sands 1993) directed at the control of behavior by states 
that generally does not present an overt threat to the neighbors. Rather, the principal 
danger is one of everyday social or economic activity presenting risks within the state in 
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which it originates, to that states’ neighbors and possibly, to the global commons. This is 
typically the activity’s externalities rather than any intent to cause harm or encroach on 
neighbor’s territory that is the cause of concern. Combating environmental problems, 
therefore, requires coordination amongst the states. In nearly every case, states have 
organized their responses to transboundary environmental problems through international 
agreements. The current generation of research, therefore, aims at assessing the 
effectiveness of these agreements, because as Zürn (1998: 649) concludes in a major 
review of international environmental policy, regime effectiveness has become the 
driving force in the analysis of international relations. In this study, I assess the 
effectiveness of the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention in Climate Change 
(UNFCCC hereafter) for reducing cardon di-oxide (CO2) emissions in sixty six countries.  
    Research so far on ensuring environmental performance has concentrated largely on 
the role of economic development. A plethora of studies have found that the relationship 
between a country’s wealth and some pollutants follow an inverted U-shaped curve, 
popularly known in the literature as the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC henceforth). 
Besides being rich, democracies fair better as compared to authoritarian countries in 
environmental quality. However, systematic analyses of effectiveness of international 
agreements in ameliorating environmental conditions are missing.  
    To the end of assessing the role of international multilateral agreements in ensuring 
environmental performance this paper consists of an empirical analysis of the 
effectiveness of the UNFCCC in sixty six nations, which are currently parties of the 
Convention for a ten year period (1991-2000). The next section consists of an overview 
of the relevant literature in this field, followed by a discussion of the research design used 
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in this paper. The final section of the paper consists of the interpretation of the findings 
from the empirical analysis. I conclude this paper by reiterating my argument that 
participation in international agreements facilitates the process of protecting one’s 
environment from further degradation. 
 4 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Substantive Debates on Effectiveness of Agreements 
   International regimes, broadly, are defined as “principles, norms, rules and decision 
making procedures around which actors expectations converge in a given issue area” 
(Krasner 1983: 1-2). States create institutions as a means of achieving collective 
objectives that could not be achieved acting unilaterally. Either directly through 
international agreements, or through the act of an existing international institution, states 
establish the new institution’s purpose, the scope of its powers and the shape and 
functions of its organ. Moreover, international agreements orient and coordinate the 
behavior of states and ultimately of enterprises, non-governmental organizations, 
individuals, steering behaviors away from activities that are environmentally destructive 
and towards those that are environmentally benign. 
    International agreements are, in general, referred to as the governance structures 
surrounding international conventions and treaties, including norms, rules, principles, and 
decision-making procedures as well as numerous actors who bring those components to 
life (Mitchell 2002: 61). Actors, both state and non-state are viewed as complex entities, 
not simply unitary maximizers (Young; 1972). The main objective of these agreements is 
to guarantee compliance with established rules, norms and standards and policies in the 
absence of a world government.  
    It is generally argued that most of the states and other actors comply with most 
international laws (Bull 1977). The predictions of Hobbesians notwithstanding, one can 
observe a considerable degree of compliance on the part of the actors. Young (1979: 31-
34) argues that compliance in a decentralized system can result from self-interest 
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calculations, fear of reprisals by another actor, felt obligation and socialization into a 
system of rules. Over time expectations converge around sets of rules.  
    Simmons (1998) further elaborates the reasons as to why countries comply with 
international agreements. According to the rationalist school of thought, international 
reputation, opportunities of reciprocity and political legitimacy can be considered as 
some of the reasons why states accede to particular international agreements. Again, the 
scholars in the domestic legalist school look at distinctive domestic regimes that tend to 
bind them into a “zone of law” in the conduct of their foreign relations. Consequently, we 
can assume that the reduction in pollution or reduction in trade in endangered species that 
we observe is due to several factors, like international agreements. 
    The last few decades have witnessed a noticeable proliferation of international 
environmental agreements, as well as growing concern in the academy and policy making 
circles. The first wave of research in this area was concerned about understanding the 
conditions under which international environmental agreements were likely to arise 
(Keohane, Haas and Levy 1993; Sprinz and Vaahoranta 1994; Young 1994). The next 
generation of research focused on ensuring the implementation of and compliance with 
these international environmental agreements (Barrett 1994; Jänicke and Weidner 1997; 
Weiss and Jacobson 1998). At present the scholars in this research program have become 
more concerned about the actual outcome of these international environmental 
agreements; i.e. whether or not these agreements have been effective. 
   The effectiveness of an environmental agreement is a function of how strong the 
agreements are in terms of the key provisions aimed at addressing an environmental 
threat, how seriously states implement those provisions, and how amenable to pressure 
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the states are. Ringquist and Kostadinova (2005: 87) point out that addressing 
environmental problems effectively requires (a) increased governmental concern 
regarding the issue; (b) contracts between the national and international levels regarding 
monitoring and credible commitments; and (c) governing capacity necessary to change 
policy. International environmental agreements can produce all of these by generating 
and disseminating scientific research, creating monitoring networks, and the generation 
of public pressure. However, amongst the current researchers of international institutions 
there has been a growing skepticism about the actual effectiveness of these environmental 
agreements (Helm and Sprinz 2000). Nonetheless, in today’s world of increasing 
international economic integration and liberalization, one cannot lose sight of the impact 
of international institutions. 
    Studies surrounding environmental protection have mostly emphasized the role of 
domestic factors, especially economic development in ameliorating environmental 
conditions. Several scholars have argued that economic growth leads to environmental 
protection and preservation. The Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) hypothesis 
proposes that there is an inverted U-shaped relation between the various indicators of 
environmental degradation and income per capita.1 This implies that economic growth 
will eventually redress the environmental impacts of the early stages of economic growth 
and that will, in turn, lead to further environmental improvements in developed countries. 
Scholars in this research area are unanimous about the fact that economic growth is 
necessary in order for environmental quality to be maintained or improved.  
                                                 
1
 This is an essential part of the sustainable development argument as put forward by the World 
Commission on Environment and Development (1987) in Our Common Future. The EKC is named after 
Simon Kuznets (1955) who hypothesized that the relationship between a measure of inequality in the 
distribution of income and the level of income is an inverted U-shape curve. 
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   Grossman and Krueger (1995) and Shafik and Bandyopadhyay (1992) find that after a 
country’s GDP per capita is recorded at around $ 8000, environmental quality is typically 
seen to improve. Therefore, it is a generally held belief that, even though environmental 
conditions deteriorate in the initial stages when the economy is growing, environmental 
condition is expected to improve after a certain point in the growth trajectory (Holtz-
Eakin and Selden 1995; Roberts and Grimes 1997). Nonetheless, the hypotheses deduced 
from the Kuznets curve logic have been largely debated (Arrow et. al 1995; Stern, 
Common and Barbier 1996; List and Gallet 1999; Perman and Stern 2003). Particularly, 
Harbaugh, Levinson and Wilson (2001) argue that very little empirical support exists for 
the inverted U-shaped pattern in the relationship between several important air pollutant 
and national income. Therefore, although there does exist some relationship between 
economic growth and environmental improvement, it cannot be generalized under all 
conditions and for all countries alike – one size does not fit all.     
    Especially for CO2, the pollutant responsible for global warming, effective price is far 
from optimal and this pollutant appears to have a monotonic EKC. Also the elasticity of 
substitution is probably lower and apparent damage is less evident to the regular 
consumers, both implying a higher turning point in the curve. Traditionally work done in 
the field of EKC has used longitudinal data with very few control variables, in order to 
estimate the net impact of income on environmental quality. This has been highly 
criticized by scholars like Arrow et al. (1995: 92) who observe that “while these studies 
do indicate that economic growth may be associated with improvements in some 
environmental indicators, they imply neither economic growth is sufficient to induce 
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environmental improvement in general, nor that the environmental effects of growth can 
be ignored”.  
     It has been observed that several of the least developed countries also have become 
parties to many international environmental accords. This is so because as Bernauer 
(1995) points out, these institutions as sets of international regulations and organizations 
that are intentionally established by preexisting actors (states) through explicit, legally or 
politically binding, international agreements in order to regulate anthropogenic sources of 
negative externalities affecting the natural environment. As evident, despite economic 
hurdles, countries deliberately become party to international agreements and comply with 
them also.  
    Besides economic development, another domestic factor that is expected to have 
profound impact on environmental conditions is the type of political system. In a recent 
study, Waldhoff (2005) shows that domestic regime type has a serious impact on the 
turning point of the EKC. Waldhoff finds that for democractic countries the turning point 
is around $ 20,000- 30,000, which rises substantially to $153,000 for autocratic countries. 
However, it is difficult to find much work done assessing the effects of international 
environmental agreements in inducing the countries to improve their relative 
environmental performance. This paper attempts to analyze the effect of UNFCCC, 
which was concluded and opened for signature in 1992 at the Rio Summit, on CO2 
emissions, which are the most threatening of all Greenhouse gases. 
Methodological Debates 
   The question about the effect of institutions is also a center of a broader debate of 
international relations theory. Several studies have suggested that international 
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institutions can have an independent effect on progress in environmental protection under 
some circumstances (Sand 1990, 1992). These studies further suggest that empirical 
research, guided by good theory can prove to be a productive way to assess the effect of 
environmental institution.  
     While estimating the effectiveness of international agreements scholars have faced 
difficulty is separating out the effects arising out of the regimes itself and those arising 
out of other factors (Young 2001). Indicators of environmental quality are affected by a 
number of variables that are independent of these agreements.  
      International agreements are as effective as parties make them. Weiss and Jacobson 
identify four factors that affect the effectiveness of an international agreement: (i) 
characteristics of the activity; (ii) characteristics of the accord; (iii) international 
environment, and (iv) domestic factors specific to the country (Weiss and Jacobson 1998: 
5-7). In this paper, I concentrate on the international and domestic factors for assessing 
the effectiveness of UNFCCC. The first two factors mentioned by Weiss and Jacobson 
are left for future research. 
   In general, effectiveness of these international agreements is analyzed based upon its 
success at achieving the goals that led to its creation. For example, Helm and Sprinz 
(1999) have proposed defining effectiveness as the amount of progress induced by the 
regime toward a regime’s collective optimum from a no-regime outcome. On the 
contrary, Miles and Underdal (2001: 4) attack this argument by using case studies to 
assess effectiveness on different scales (ranging from 0-4 for behavioral change and 1-3 
for environmental improvement) and then normalizing them to a range from 0-1. Both 
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approaches produce a common metric of effectiveness ranging from no improvement 
relative to no-regime outcome to full achievement of the collective optimum.  
   Underdal (2002) further argues that effectiveness of international environmental 
agreements is a product of the interaction of problem malignancy and the institutional 
setting created to address the problem. While the core element of problem malignancy is 
the extent to which rational action of the individual states produces a suboptimal outcome 
for all. The essence of institutional setting lies in its capacity, or the ability of these 
institutions to generate resources, establish rules and goals without unanimity among 
participants, and enforce the terms of the agreements. Regimes that address difficult 
problems with low levels of institutional capacity would be less effective and vice versa.  
   The malignant environmental problem addressed in this paper is global warming due to 
excess emission of carbon-dioxide (CO2). The international environmental institution 
developed to take care of this problem was United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992 at the Earth Summit. Researchers in the EKC 
program argue that CO2 has a monotonic EKC. Holtz-Eakin and Selden (1995) estimate 
quadratic EKCs for CO2 on panel data showing the very high turning points for this 
pollutant. They project that the global CO2 emissions growth continues at a 1.8 per cent 
per annum for the foreseeable future. This is so because output and population will grow 
most rapidly in low-income countries with a high marginal propensity to emit. Given 
such a pessimistic picture one wonders whether there has been or can be any effect of the 
UNFCCC for these low- income countries. International environmental institutions may 
be effective in changing this picture.  
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    The conceptualization of institutional effectiveness varies immensely. According to 
Jacobeit (1998: 300) many scholars have focused on political variables, including those 
in the economic political domain by Keohane et al. or legal political domain by Victor, 
and others. Underdal (1997) conceptualizes regime effectiveness as environmental 
problem solving in terms of relative improvements in counterfactual state of affairs, i.e., 
the absence of an international regime and in terms of improvement relative to a collective 
optimum. This criterion evaluates relative progress in environmental protection against 
the baseline of a world without the institution. This had been the most popular measure 
used to operationalize regime effectiveness (Helm and Sprinz 1999). Therefore, in this 
paper attempt has been made to use a measure of regime effectiveness that captures the 
change brought over from a world without the agreement to a world with the agreement 
in place, i.e. how much success have been achieved.  
. 
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RESEARCH DESIGN 
Dependent Variable 
  The dependent variable I am trying to explain is effectiveness of the climate change 
regime. According to Mitchell (2002) a dependent variable so designed needs to capture 
both aspects of success, i. e. how much change the regime/ agreement induced and how 
hard the change was to induce. As it is difficult to get usable information on the cost 
required to induce change of behavior, I concentrate on the first aspect of success: how 
much change the agreement induced. In line with Zürn (1998) and Jacobeit (1998), both 
of whom regard emission-based approaches to the measurement of international regime 
effectiveness as promising, I would operationalise the dependent variable as the 
percentage change of CO2 emission in each of the sixty-six countries, which are party to 
UNFCCC, from 1991-2000, compared to the base year 1990 (refer to Appendix I for 
more detailed discussion of the variables and Appendix II for the name of countries and 
their year of ratification).  
    In order to correctly assess regime effectiveness the model should consist of essentially 
three elements: policy factors, external environmental factors, and national capacity and 
development factors (Ringquist and Kostadinova 2005: 93; Weiss and Jacobson 1998). 
UNFCCC required that upon ratification committed signatories' governments should 
move towards a voluntary "non-binding aim" to reduce atmospheric concentrations of 
greenhouse gases with the goal of "preventing dangerous anthropogenic interference with 
Earth's climate system." These actions were aimed primarily at industrialized countries, 
with the intention of stabilizing their emissions of greenhouse gases at 1990 levels by the 
year 2000; and other responsibilities would be incumbent upon all UNFCCC parties 
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(UNFCCC 1992). Since not all the signatories ratified the Convention at the same time, a 
model was devised to measure the relative progress made in signatory states before and 
after ratification. Moreover, percentage reduction of emissions is considered to be a better 
measure for assessing the impact of environmental agreement, as measuring only the 
absolute differences would not reveal a very clear picture. 
    Regressing this dependent variable on a set of independent and control variables 
including at least one agreement-related variable, would then allow using the regression 
co-efficient (b) on agreement-related variable as a metric of effectiveness of that 
agreement that would be comparable across the unit of analysis (Mitchell 2002). 
    I had to restrict my sample to sixty-six countries due to non-availability of data for all 
the 189 countries who are currently member of the UNFCCC. Data for the total CO2 
emission for the entire sample was taken from World Development Indicators 2004.2 
Independent and Control Variables  
   The above discussion delineates the chief explanatory variable of this study, i.e. 
membership in international environmental institutions (Memit membership in UNFCCC 
for country i in year t). Besides testing the hypothesis that international agreements are 
effective in ameliorating environmental conditions, this intuitively also helps us to 
evaluate the theory that holds that regimes only influence the behavior of those states 
legally bound by a given rule. This variable is coded as 1 for the countryi the year after 
that country ratifies UNFCCC and 0 for the period prior to that. Conventional wisdom 
guides us that there would be passage of some time after which a noticeable impact of the 
agreement on a country’s environmental performance can be noticed. Therefore, another 
                                                 
2
 East and Central European countries have been not included due to non-availability of data for the years 
under study. Moreover, most of these countries were under transition during this time period. Including 
these countries could have skewed the results.  
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important independent variable would be membership counter coded as 0 up to the year a 
country ratifies the Convention and the number of years it had been a party up until 2000. 
This would help to capture the trend effect (Lewis-Beck1986). If our assumption is 
correct then the coefficients for the membership counter variable should show a negative 
sign, implying: (i) countries when member to an international agreement would perform 
better, i. e. reduce CO2 emission; and (ii) longer they are member of the agreement an 
improvement can be observed in their performance.  Moreover, a time counter variable is 
also included, coded as1 through 10 for each country. This is another way to see the 
direction of a country’s performance over time.  
   Young (2001) pointed out that conceptualizing the no-regime outcome in terms of 
interactive decision-making among self interested states leads us to focus only on policy 
games themselves and to neglect a number of other driving forces –– demographic, 
economic and technological – that interact to produce important environmental impact.    
Therefore, GDP per capita (GDPit) of these countries in all the years is included as the 
control variable. This would also help us to evaluate national capacity of the countries 
included. Data on this variable is also taken from the World Development Indicators 
2004. As the relationship between income and environmental quality is assumed to be 
curvilinear a squared term of the GDP per capita is also included. If EKC truly holds for 
CO2 emissions, then the coefficient of the former should be positive, while for the latter 
or the squared term should be negative indicating that pollution rises in the initial phase 
of economic growth, eventually reaching a plateau and then decreasing.  
   Another measure of national capacity can be economic growth of a country. There are 
two competing hypotheses in this area (Jahn 1998): on the one hand, countries with high 
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economic growth would be better equipped to combat environmental pollution. On the 
other hand, rich countries have higher levels of consumption, which can further lead to 
environmental degradation. In order to check the validity of these hypotheses a second 
model is used including economic growth.  
   The countries included in the study are divided into two groups under the Framework 
Convention – Annex I and non Annex (UNFCCC 1992). The Annex I countries are the 
economically and technologically advanced countries for whom it was mandatory to 
reduce their emissions to 1990 level by 2000. Therefore, the study includes another 
independent variable called Annex, coded as 1 for the Annex I countries and 0 otherwise. 
If economic improvement begets better environmental performance, then Annex should 
be negatively related to the dependent variable. As it is already assumed by many 
scholars that industrialized or Annex I countries would perform better, an interaction 
term is also included with membership. If the assumptions so far hold true that developed 
countries have better environment, then we can expect that the interaction term would be 
negatively related to the dependent variable implying the industrialized, rich nations emit 
less.  
   Other control variables that follow from the theory are share of industry in the 
country’s GDP, percentage of urban population, and type of political system (Waldhoff 
2005). Including these variables ensures some amount of control over the domestic and 
external environment (Ringquist and Kostadinova 2005: 93). Percentage of industry in a 
country’s GDP measures industrial activity, which can be a potential source of excessive 
pollution. This variable should be positively related to CO2 emissions. However, this 
measure for industrial activity does not account for energy efficiency, i. e. reducing use 
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of coal and fossil fuel, which are the principal emitters of CO2. Nonetheless becoming 
energy efficient is an important tactic employed by the countries to reduce CO2 
emissions. Hence, coal and fossil fuel consumption can be considered endogenous to 
Convention ratification. Data for this variable has been taken from the World 
Development Indicators 2004.  
   Again there exist substantial amount of literature claiming that political factors, like 
political stability, democratic polity, have a bearing on the environmental quality of the 
nation (Jänicke 1992; Sprinz 1998; Waldhoff 2005). Waldhoff (2005) argues that coupled 
with wealth of a nation, democratic polity, along with its free press and presence of 
various interest groups, has had good effect in reducing pollution. The polity variable in 
the study is a measure of how democratic a country is on a scale of -10 to +10. Data has 
been taken from POLITY IV project (refer to appendix I). This variable presumably 
should show negative relation with the dependent variable implying lower scores on the 
scale means poor environmental quality.  
   Much can be said about urban population. Environmentalists have for a long time 
debated the role of urban sprawl in the developed countries. With the growing wave of 
economic liberalization, this has now become a characteristic of developing nations also. 
Growing urban population is definitely a precondition of growing environmental 
pollution. Hence, this variable should be positively related to the pollution levels. Again, 
political economists like Barro (1998) argue that urbanization is one of the indicators of a 
country’s economic development. As already mentioned, one of the assumptions in this 
paper is that industrialized country pollute less, we can expect that high percentage of 
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urban population would imply less emission. Data for this variable is also available from 
the World Development Indicators 2004.  
    Generalized least squares on a panel data for sixty six countries for ten years have been 
applied on the following model: 
Yit = α + β` Xit + Ut + εit 
Where, Yit = Percentage of CO2 emissions compared to 1990 as the base year; 
            Xit = Matrix of all independent variables; 
            Ui = Random disturbances characterizing the i th observation and is constant 
through time.3 
 
                                                 
3
 Fixed effects model was not included due to technical problems. 
 18 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
 
Variable 
 
Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
DV 
 
660 .344 .502 -.455 4.913 
Mem 
 
660 .598 .490 0 1 
Mem_Counter 
 
660 2.169 2.293 0 8 
Annex 
 
660 .318 .466 0 1 
Interaction 
 
660 .2060 .404 0 1 
GDP 
percapita 
660 7593 10561 135.01 44798.75 
GDP pc – sq 
 
660 1.69e+08 3.54e+08 18227.81 2.01e+09 
Pop 
 
660 54.73 23.19 5.31 97.33 
Industry 
 
660 29.54 7.91 9.22 53.54 
Polity 
 
659 6.27 5.69 -9 10 
GDP growth 
 
660 -.186 2.850 -14.89 26.35 
Time_counter 
 
660 5.5 2.87 1 10 
 19 
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
   Table 2 and 3 reports results, coefficients, Z scores and standard errors (in parentheses), 
for the full sample of sixty-six countries.  
    Table 2 shows that membership in the UNFCCC has significant impact on 
environmental quality. The memberships counter variable shows that pollution or 
emission have a decreasing trend over the years and is highly significant. As 
hypothesized, the longer that countries are member of the environmental agreement, the 
better they perform. Figure 1 further substantiates that after UNFCCC came into place in 
1992, there has been a visible change in the emission patterns of the countries in the 
sample. Around 1990-92, the percentage of CO2 emission, as compared to 1990, was 
clustered around -0.5 and + 0.5. But with the passage of time, there developed two 
separate clusters of countries. Although the time counter variable is positively and 
significantly related to the dependent variable implying the emissions increase 
considerably with the passage of time, we can conclude that the presence of an effective 
environmental agreement would mitigate that result.  
    The environmental performance of a country is further improved by its economic 
development. As the coefficient on the Annex variable show in table 1, that it 
significantly matters whether or not a country is in the Annex 1 category or not; Annex 1 
being the group of developed, industrialized countries. Moreover, looking at the 
interaction term one can clearly say that a country which is industrialized and also a 
member of the international agreement like UNFCCC would definitely perform better 
compared to developing or non Annex 1 countries.  
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   Table 2: Effect of UNFCCC on CO2 emissions for all countries 
1991-2000 
 
 
 
Variables 
 
Co-efficients z 
Membership .129 
(.06) 
2.14** 
Membership counter -.033 
(.016) 
-2.00** 
 
Control Variables- International Regime Effect 
 
Annex -.182 
(.065) 
-2.78** 
Membership * 
Annex 
 
-.315 
(.072) 
-4.32*** 
Time counter .082 
(.013) 
5.87*** 
 
Domestic Regime Effects 
 
GDP percapita 9.31e-06 
(8.75e-06) 
1.06 
GDP percap-sq -2.09e-11 
(1.73e-10) 
-1.21 
Urban Population -.001 
(.0013) 
-1.75* 
GDP percapita*Pop 
 
3.79e-08 
(9.39e-08) 
0.40 
Industry .0007 
(.0021) 
0.34 
Polity -.008 
(.0037) 
-2.17** 
Constant .084 
(.087) 
0.97 
 
                 *** p< .01; ** p<.05; *p<.1 
                  N = 659 
                  Wald χ2 = 285.55*** 
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  The above-mentioned argument, in part, supports the EKC hypothesis. Although, GDP 
per capita and its square terms individually does not reach statistical significance, further 
analysis show that these variables are jointly significant. A likelihood ratio test between 
the unrestricted and restricted (dropping GDP per capita and its square) models yield 
highly significant test statistic. This implies that with increase in GDP per capita a 
country would initially experience an increase in pollution, which eventually reaches a 
plateau and then starts phasing out. Intuitively, this result reveals that after a nation has 
met its subsistence requirements, it would become more concerned about the 
environment. However, the argument made in this paper should be treated as a 
complement to the EKC assumption. Improving national capacity can definitely help in 
ameliorating environmental degradation. Similarly, participation in international 
environmental agreements can further accelerate the process. 
   Besides membership and economic development, some of the other variables also show 
interesting results. For example, percentage of urban population is negative and 
significant. Contrary to what environmentalists argued, urban sprawl is seen to reduce 
pollution for all the countries. One explanation for this finding is that urbanization is 
largely related to modernization and development (Barro 1998). So when we see that a 
large percentage of people live in urban area, one assumes that the country is developed 
to some extent and is slowly becoming energy efficient.        
    This is further strengthened by the results of the polity score. It shows that countries 
low on the polity score would pollute more, i.e. democratic countries significantly pollute 
less compared to authoritarian countries. Waldhoff (2005) argues further that for a 
democratic country the turning point is reached at a lower level of GDP per capita, but 
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for an authoritarian country the cut-off point is much high. This reflects the fact that even 
for a developing country, with a democratic polity, improvement of environmental 
conditions would start earlier than any other authoritarian developing country. Therefore, 
a case can be made from here that as and how a country democraticizes and urbanizes, it 
would slowly become more environmentally aware. 
    However, Table 3 shows some changes in the earlier results. After including GDP 
growth variable in the same model, the sign changes on the membership counter variable. 
This new results imply that longer the countries are member they pollute more. This 
might be due to the heavy emphasis of developing countries in the sample. The poor and 
developing countries, although members of multilateral institutions tend to involve in 
higher economic activities leading to higher pollution. The change in result might also be 
due to multi-colleniarity. The economic growth variable, as coded in this paper, is 
positively correlated with most of the other independent and control variables. 
Nonetheless annex and the interaction term remain negatively and significantly related to 
the dependent variable. Therefore, industrialized countries that are also member of the 
UNFCCC would emit less. Another change in result is that percentage of urban 
population loses its significance, but retains its directional relationship with the 
dependent variable.  
 
 
 
 24 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-
.
5
0
.
5
1
co
2 
e
m
iss
io
n
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000
year
Carbon dioxide emission for all countries 1990-2000
 
        Figure 2: CO2 emissions as predicted by the model 
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Table 3: Effect of UNFCCC on CO2 emissions for all countries 
1991-2000 (with GDP growth) 
 
 
Variables 
 
Co-efficients z 
Membership .260 
(.06) 
4.50*** 
Membership counter .037 
(.011) 
3.25** 
 
Control Variables- International Regime Effect 
 
Annex -.203 
(.066) 
-3.08** 
Membership * 
Annex 
 
-.333 
(.074) 
-4.46*** 
 
Domestic Regime Effects 
 
GDP growth .004 
(.006) 
 
0.67 
GDP percapita 6.75e-06 
(6.27e-06) 
 
1.08 
GDP percap-sq -6.34e-11 
(1.75e-10) 
 
-0.36 
Urban Population -.001 
(.0009) 
 
-1.53 
Industry -.0010 
(.0021) 
 
-0.48 
Polity -.0077 
(.0039) 
 
-1.97** 
Constant .359 
(.074) 
4.85*** 
                 *** p< .01; ** p<.05; *p<.1 
                  N = 659 
                  Wald χ2 = 241.06*** 
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CONCLUSION AND FURTHER IMPLICATIONS 
    The principal explanatory variable for assessing the effectiveness of the UNFCCC did 
show significant impact in bringing about desired changes in a world with the institution. 
Again, to be borne in mind that economic development and a democratic polity are 
potential facilitators in the process of attaining better environment.  
   However, these results should not be over exaggerated. International agreements, of all 
kinds, have their own drawbacks. Although we find that UNFCCC has been quite 
effective in reducing CO2 emissions in the member countries, one cannot ignore the fact 
that it is only the beginning. Moreover, environment is considered to be a public good, 
which would require more commitment on the part of the member nations to make them 
effective in achieving its objective.  
    Weiss and Jacobson mention that in order for an international agreement to be 
effective, it needs to account for the characteristic of the problem. In this paper, emphasis 
was placed on the part of the actors in making this agreement effective. A close analysis 
of the characteristics of the accord also warrants attention in order to keep it effective in 
future.  
   Even for that matter national capacity of the actors was aggregated into two variables: 
economic development and political system. It is to be borne in mind that in order to 
implement the provisions of the agreement successfully, member countries will have to 
develop their infrastructure base, promulgate legislation in support of those provisions, 
and ensure stringent mechanisms of monitoring and investigation. Future research should 
make an attempt to include these factors also within national capacity.  
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   Several things remain on the part of the framers of these agreements. An analysis of 
these agreements reveals that to be effective the agreements should be able to overcome 
two most important obstacles: political complexity and scientific uncertainty. On the 
former, international efforts are needed to address the political aspect of global warming, 
which requires close cooperation among the developed and the developing nations. 
Scientific uncertainty can be overcome by channeling more research grants into this area.  
   Financial mechanism of the regimes/ agreements can be expected to have great impact 
on its effectiveness, especially for developing countries, like the global environmental 
fund (GEF) or the Montreal Fund under the Montreal Protocol. UNFCCC does not 
provide anything even remotely similar to these to its members. As has been evident from 
the findings here that member countries are attempting to fulfill the requirements of the 
agreements, better provisions of the agreement, like financial help, can accelerate the 
process further. 
   In addition to the above-mentioned provisions, the agreement should be able to respond 
to non-compliance in a facilitative way. Sanctions are not considered to be an effective 
mechanism in ensuring compliance, and in turn effectiveness. There should be 
mechanisms both for reward and punishment in-built in the agreements to entice the 
member countries. 
   In the absence of a supranational authority, institutions can play an extremely effective 
role in directing states’ behavior. However, mindless negotiations of these multilateral 
agreements will not get us far. Along with the framers, member countries also have a 
distinct role to play. Keeping all these factors in mind, I conclude by reiterating my 
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argument that along with economic development and democracy, participation in 
multilateral agreements would bring about desired environmental benefits.  
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APPENDIX 1: VARIABLE DESCRIPTION 
 
Variables 
 
Description 
Dependent Variable Percentage change of Carbon-di-oxide emission in 
66 countries from 1991 to 2000, compared to 1990 
as base year. 
 
 
Explanatory variables 
 
Membership Ratifying UNFCCC; coded 0 until the year a 
country ratifies and 1 thereafter 
 
Membership counter Measures number of years after each nation ratified 
the convention  
 
 
Control Variables 
 
Annex Coded as 1 for industrialized countries in Annex 1 
category under UNFCCC and 0 otherwise 
 
GDP per capita GDP per capita for all nations (in 1995 USD) 
 
GDP per capita sq Squared transformation of GDP per capita, included 
to capture non-linear relationship between income 
and pollution as hypothesized by EKC 
 
Urban Population Percentage of population living in urban areas 
 
Polity Polity2 variable: Computed by subtracting AUTOC 
from DEMOC; normal range polity scores are 
imputed for coded "-77" and "-88" special polity 
conditions, polities coded "-66" on the POLITY 
variable are left blank 
 
Industry Percentage share of the industrial sector of a country 
in its total GDP 
 
Time counter Numbered 1-10 for the 10 yrs time period for each 
panel to capture trend of CO2 emissions 
 
GDP growth Percentage change in GDP compared to a base year 
1990 
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APPENDIX II: COUNTRIES AND YEAR OF RATIFICATION 
 
CID Country Year of Ratification 
Annex I 
 
66 Austria 1992 
2 Belgium 1996 
8 Bulgaria 1995 
11 Canada 1992 
16 Denmark 1993 
20 Finland 1994 
21 France 1994 
24 Greece 1994 
28 Hungary 1994 
30 Ireland 1994 
31 Italy 1994 
33 Japan 1993 
41 Netherlands 1993 
42 New Zealand 1993 
44 Norway 1993 
50 Poland 1994 
51 Portugal 1993 
52 Romania 1994 
55 Spain 1993 
57 Sweden 1993 
62 United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland 
1993 
 
Non Annex 1 
 
65 Argentina 1994 
1 Bangladesh 1994 
3 Benin 1994 
4 Bhutan 1995 
5 Bolivia 1994 
6 Botswana 1994 
7 Brazil 1994 
9 Burundi 1997 
10 Cameroon 1994 
12 Chile 1994 
13 China 1993 
14 Colombia 1995 
15 Costa Rica 1994 
17 Dominican Republic 1998 
18 Ecuador 1993 
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CID Country Year of Ratification 
19 El Salvador 1995 
22 Gambia 1994 
23 Ghana 1995 
25 Guatemala 1995 
26 Guinea 1993 
27 Honduras 1995 
29 India 1993 
32 Jamaica 1995 
34 Jordan 1993 
35 Madagascar 1999 
36 Malawi 1994 
37 Malaysia 1994 
38 Mali 1994 
39 Mauritius 1992 
40 Mexico 1993 
43 Nicaragua 1995 
45 Panama 1995 
46 Papua New Guinea 1993 
47 Paraguay 1994 
48 Peru 1993 
49 Philippines 1994 
53 Senegal 1994 
54 South Africa 1997 
56 Sri Lanka 1993 
58 Thailand 1994 
59 Trinidad & Tobago 1994 
60 Tunisia 1993 
61 Uganda 1993 
63 Uruguay 1994 
64 Vietnam 1994 
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